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I am deeply conscious of the great honour 
that is bestowed by the Indian Psychiatric 
Society in selecting me to deliver the D. L. 
N. Murti Rao Oration. It is in the nature 
of giants to take giant strides where lesser 
mortals proceed in a pedestrian way. So it 
was that Dr. D. L. N. Murti Rao who strode 
through the beginning of Indian Psychiatry 
and the breath and vision of his personality 
is still felt by the large number of students 
who have strived to keep alive the shining 
example that he set, and the institute that 
he headed is even today one of the foremost 
academic centres in the country. I would 
like to discuss today what I believe to be a 
common clinical entity-the Emotional Distress 
Syndrome. 
NATURE OF STRESS 
The soldier who sustains a wound in battle, 
the player exerting himself to the full in the 
match, the mother worrying about her chil-
dren's health, the gambler watching the races, 
and the rider and horse are all under stress. 
The beggar suffering from hunger, the big 
businessman concerned about his next million 
and the doctor presenting a paper in front of 
an audience are all under stress. What is 
this mysterious thing that touches on every-
ones lift-, infact it touches on the very essence 
of life and health and disease. 
At this point I may mention the semantic 
confusion involved in the indiscriminate use 
of the word stress. The word stress is used to 
describe the specific agent responsible for the 
disturbance of equilibrium in the subject as 
well as to describe the state of organism or 
object which is subjected to stress e.g. stress 
fractures in bones, airplane bodies etc. Selye 
in the stress of life (1965) suggests that the 
word stress should be used to designate the 
sum of all the non-specific effects of various 
factors acting on the body whereas these agents 
should be referred to as stressors when we 
refer to their ability to produce stress. He 
describes three stages in the stress syndrome-
(a) the initial response or alarm reaction. 
During this stage the organism is on full alert 
with marked increase in output of adrenal 
cortical hormones. Since no organism can 
continue to be in a state of alarm indefinitely 
if the noxious agent is very damaging, death 
may occur within a few hours or days. 
However, in most cases the organism brings 
into operation certain defensive measures to 
cope with the stress this he referred to as-(b) the 
stage of resistance. In case the exposure 
to stress is continued, this adaptation pro-
gressively fails leading to the third-(c) stage of 
exhaustion. The totality of this non-specific 
response pattern is referred to as the ''General 
Adaptation Syndrome", hence he defines 
"Stress is a state manifested by a specific syn-
drome which consists of all the non-specifi-
cally induced change within a biologic syste-
m", hence although it has certain common 
specific manifestation, it is non-specilically 
induced by a variety of causes. This is 
in contrast to the local adaptation syndrome 
in which a specific noxious agent produces a 
localized adaptive responses which is specific 
for that particular noxious agent. 
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THE NATURE OF ANXIETY 
Any hypothesis about the origin and deve-
lopment of such a complex and universal phe-
nomenon of the human condition as anxiety, 
has a very close relationship with the parti-
cular ideas of the author about human nature 
with the prevailing scientific and philosophic 
spirit of the times. Our concepts are formed, 
partly by reflections about ourselves and at 
the same time about the human condition in 
general. Reflection is to be understood in its 
deeper anthropological meaning which is 
evoked in the following words of Romano 
Guardini (1954). It is characteristic of 
human life that man can once again overcome 
the immediate context of his existence and the 
possibility of gaining a distance to consider is 
"reflection '. Reflection is first of all directed 
towards that which is most disturbing, what 
Saint Augustine called the 'enigma of life'viv. 
"From whence I came here, this, which I call 
life-that dies, and death that lives." 
Anxiety thus occurs at the point when some 
emerging potentiality faces the individual. 
Some possibility of fulfilling his existence, but 
this very possibility involves the destroying of 
the present security, thus often giving rise to 
the tendency to deny the new potentiality. In 
relation to the world a person is exposed to new 
possibilities, hence to feelings of anxiety, as 
long as he is alive (The world as used here 
refers to the structure of ameaningful relati-
onships in which a person exists and the design 
in which he participates). The world is not 
limited to the past experiences but also incudes 
all the possibilities which open up before the 
person in the future. The world is not something 
static something 'here' which the person then 
'accepts' or 'adjusts to' but rather, it is a 
dynamic pattern which so long as I possess 
self-consciousness, I am in the process of for-
ming and designing. The existentialist dis-
tinguishes three modes of this world (a) the 
Umwelt meaning the biological and environ-
mental world around us (b) the A/jfaW/-refers 
to the world of beings like oneself-the world of 
fellow men and women and (c) The Eigen 
welt-literally the own world-thc mode of rela-
tionship to oneself. 
The difference between this normal exis-
tential anxiety and the clinical anxiety has not 
received any attention in the literature. Brie-
fly, existential anxiety is the result of awareness 
of the contingency of human existence. The 
confirmation of the lack of meaning of life 
leads the authentic man to search for a mean-
ing-his never being able to rest, or be at peace, 
is at the core of existential anxiety and is seen 
mainly in relation to the self i.e. eigen welt. 
However, clinical anxiety is characterised 
by an inability to cope with stress, in the 
outer world i.e. the unwelt and mitwelt. 
NATURE OF DISEASE 
24 centuries ago, Hippocrates, the Father of 
Medicine told his disciples that disease is not 
only suffering (Pathos) but also toil (Ponos), 
that is, the fight of the body to restore itself 
towards normal. In other words disease is 
not mere surrender to a noxious agent or stress 
but a fight for health and unless there is a 
fight, there is no disease but simply death. 
Claude Bernard in France and Walter B. 
Canon at Harvard described this tendency 
of the body as an attempt of the body to 
maintain a constancy of their internal milieu 
i.e. to maintain homestasis. Nearly 80 years 
ago, Freud the Father of modem psychiatry and 
Psychoanalysis also came to the same conclu-
sion with respect to mental disorders the 
disease as seen clinically was a manifes-
tation mainly of these defensive ego mecha-
nisms i.e. the fight for survival and health. 
The similarity is obvious—physical or emo-
tional stress produces certain changes in the 
body which are signs of damage but these are 
also quite characteristic manifestations of the 
body's adaptive reactions which together 
constitute the symptoms of the disease. 
Our studies of the normal grief reaction 
among parents who have suddenly lost their 
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a relatively uniform pattern of emotional 
disturbance going through a) an initial stage 
of shock or emotional numbness lasting a few 
hours to a few days and followed b) by a stage 
of marked anxiety, sadness and hopelessness. 
(c) this is then followed by the stage of resolu-
tion and readjustment, (d) In some cases a 
residual state of sadness may persist. Thus at 
the psychological level this common response 
to stress may be viewed as a non specific 
universal response, varying in nature and 
severity with the degree of stress and the adap-
tive capabilities of the individual, akin to the 
general adaption syndrome of inflamation seen 
at the physical level, and termed as Emotio-
nal Distress Syndrome. This E. D. S. or grief 
reaction was seen to be a well defined and 
uniformly predictable pattern, and in almost 
all cases, clinical recovery and return to normal 
functioning occured within a period of 6 
month (Singh and Tewari, 1980; Singh 
et al., 1989), (Table I). 
Only very recently the Federal Centre for 
Disease Control in the U. S. A. in 1987 has 
formally defined the C. F. S. or Chronic Fati-
gue Syndrome. In 50% of these patients 
severe physical and or mental stress is a major 
source of their problem. According to Dr. 
Richard Poddol—-"They have too many 
demands in their lives and cope by being 
tired." When obvious stress is not apparent, 
most experts suspect underlying psychological 
and emotional problems. A study published 
in 1988 in the Archives Internal Medicine 
found that out of 100 patients with C. F. S. 
the vast majority (64%) had a psychiatric 
diagnosis, primarily anxiety and to lesser 
extent depression. Only 5 patients had a 
medical condition to explain their exhaustion 
and fatique and no explanations could be 
found in 31 patients. 
Most of these patients are clinically labelled 
as suffering from anxiety or depression, but 
according to Dr. Poddol most of them are 
aware of the reason for their excessive fatigue 
or depression- Roughly half, stress that they 
are primarily feeling listless and tired and not 
depressed. He is often tired, unable to enjoy 
social or sexual activity or even family events 
but is not necessarily depressed although some 
of them may ultimately develop feelings of 
sadness and hopelessness. These persons who 
are suffering with symptoms of anxiety and 
depression in the face of stress, in my opin-
ion can not be labelled as suffering from a 
disease because of the absence of the ponos 
or fight. Clinically they resemble subjects in 
the second stage of grief reaction- It is only 
after the stage of resolution that we can label 
the person as suffering from anxiety or dep-
ression as a disease entity. 
PREVALENCE OF ANXIETY 
NEUROSIS IN GENRAL 
POPULATION 
Although an estimated 5% of the general 
population suffer from anxiety neurosis, there 
is little data concerning the range or degree 
of distress resulting from the disorder and its 
long term outcome (Noycs, 1976; Blair et. al., 
TABLE I. Tht Emotional Distress Syndrome 
A. General Adaptation Syndrome B. Grief Reaction in Children C. Emotional Distress Syndrome 
(Selye) (Bowlby) (G. Singh) 
1- Alarm Reaction 
2. Stage of Resistance 
3. Stage of Exhaustion 
1. Stage of Protest 
2. Stage of Despair 
3. Stage of Detachment 
1. Initial Stage of shock or dis-
belief 
2. Stage of anxiety, sadness, 
withdrawal 
3. Stage of active resistance and 
resolution 16  OURMEET SINGH 
1957; Eitinger, 1955; Wheeler et al., 1950 
and Kannel et al., 1958). 
In a 6 year follow up study by Noyes et al. 
(1980) on 112 anxiety neurotics and 110 surgi-
cal controls, found a generally favourable out-
come in about two thirds of all patients, 29% 
were symptom free and another 39% reported 
only mild symptoms. These together consti-
tuted 68% with a favourable outcome. This is 
similar to the figure of 67% reported in an 
earlier study and 50% reported by Greer 
et al. 
More interestingly 22% of their surgical 
controls also met the study criteria for anxiety 
neurosis, suggesting that the actual prevalence 
of anxiety neurosis, is much higher than the 
5% figure usually cited or they are not really 
cases of anxiety neurosis but simply a state of 
emotional distress. Community surveys 
such as the one conducted in Framingham 
tend to support this possibility. 21% of the 
residents of this community were identified 
as having anxiety neurosis alone. 
RELATIONSHIP OF ANXIETY AND 
DEPRESSION 
D.S.M. Ill differentiates between genera-
lized anxiety and panic disorder in both of 
which there is marked over anxiety, and also 
between phobic and obsessive-compulsive 
disorders-in both these conditions, the patients 
goes to great lengths to avoid experiencing the 
anxiety related to the dreaded object or situa-
tion. Similarly. DSM III recognizes a num-
ber of depressive disorders based on such 
considerations as severity and whether or not 
there is a history of manic or hypomanic 
attacks. Dysthymic disorder-literally dys-
thymia means ''ill humored with an indication 
to melancholy." Hence it has been used 
to include all unpleasant affective states 
including depression, anxiety and obsessional 
traits. These divisions are not vet based on 
firm scientific data which would convincingly 
prove that they have any clinical, therapeutic 
or prognostics import (Marks, 1987). 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL 
PARAMETERS 
Let ns briefly look at the psychophysiolo-
gical parameters whether they arc able to 
distinguish between anxiety and depression. 
Lader at al. (1967) showed that patients with 
anxiety states showed high levels of electro-
dermal activity and slow habituation of con-
ductance responses to repeated auditory 
stimuli, when depressives were divided into 
subgroups of retarded and agitated depressives 
similar differences in electro dermal activity 
emerged (Lader and Wing, 1969). The 
retarded group showed almost no elcctroder-
mal activity while the agitated depressives 
were very similar to the anxious patients. 
Investigating evoked potentials in depres-
sed and anxious patients, Shagass (1955) 
applied photic stimulation at 10 and 15 H Z 
and measured cortical evoked responses in 
normals, anxious patients, neurotic depres-
sives and psychotic depressives. The responsi-
veness was highest in the anxious patients and 
lowest in the retarded psychotic depressive, 
with normal and neurotic depressives in 
between. 
CLINICAL FEATURES OF ANXITY 
AND DEPRESSION 
The symptoms and signs of these two con-
ditions can be divided into three classes : 
1. Symptoms that are specific to anxiety 
2. Symptoms that are specific to depression. 
3. Signs and symptoms which are common 
to both syndromes. 
Although the clinical relationship of an-
xiety and depression still remains a subject 
of controversy in psychiatric practice. A 
majority of workers in recent years have poin-
ted to the fact that mixed anxiety-depressive 
picture is the most common-manifestation in 
primary can- populations although by force 
of habits we artificially tend to label them as 
primarily anxious or primarily depressed. 
Nutsinger and Zcpotoczky (1985) found 83% 
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a diagnosis of depression. Shehan and Shehan 
(1982) reported 92% of his patients with 
panic disorder as having a typical depression, 
while the Newcastle group (Gurney ct a]., 
l972;Rothet al., 1972; Shapira ct al., 1972) 
reported that 65% of patients with anxiety 
disorders had episodes of secondary depression. 
In addition a considerable number of family 
studies suggest a casual relationship between 
anxiety and depression particularly in panic 
disorder, agoraphobia and obsessive-compul-
sive disorder (Cloninger ct al., 1981; Dealey 
et al., 1982; Munjack ct al., 1981; Crowe 
etal., 1982; Weissmannet al., 1984; Leckman 
et al., 1983; Matuzas et al., 1983; Sargent, 
1962; Pollitt and Young, 1971 and Shehan; 
et al., 1980). 
ASSESSMENT OF ANXIETY AND 
DEPRESSION 
Another conceptual and methodological 
problem is the fact that most instrument 
designed to measure anxiety or depression 
give a single global score. Yet we know that 
neither anxiety nor depression is a unitary con-
cept. In fact each is composed of a number 
of behavioural, psychophysiological, bioche-
mical, cognitive and emotional components 
which are only imperfectly correlated. The 
nature and degree and correlation between 
anxiety and depression therefore will vary 
greatly, depending upon the specific com-
ponent being investigated. 
The most commonly used scales are :— 
(I) Doctor Rating scale : 
1. Hamilton Anxiety Scale 
2. Hamilton Depressive Scale 
3. Beck Depressive Inventory 
4. New Castle Anxiety-Depressive Scale 
5. Physicians Questionnaire 
(II) Self Rating Scales 
1. Hopkins Symptom Checklist and 
S.C.L. 90. 
2. Profile of Mood States 
3. Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. 
4. Zung Self Rating Scale. 
5. Amritsar Depressive Inventory. 
Clinical studies using various self report 
scales and clinical diagnostic critera eg. 
Dinardo et al. (1983) Barlow (1986) Johnstone 
(1980), Mendels (1972) Gurney et al. (1972) 
Singh and Sharma (1988) all reported inability 
to distinguish pure anxiety from depressive 
neurosis. 
In our attempt to develop a simple instru-
ment to measure depression, we finally deve-
loped the 30 item Amritsar Depressive Inven-
tory after every effort was made to exclude 
items that showed a correlation of 0.3 or more 
with anxiety. Inspiteof this the normals score 
upto 5 on this scale. Patients of anxiety 
neurosis score upto 10, and the cut off point 
for diagnosing depression is 15 and for severe 
depression 20. Thus it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish anxiety and depression when pre-
sent in mild degree. 
Clancy et al. (1979) in a follow up study 
reported that the most common complication 
of anxiety neurosis appears to be depression 
which developed in over half of their patients. 
The same conclusions were reached by Kendell 
(1974) and Noyes (1980) who found 44% of 
112 anxiety neurotics showed a potentially 
serious depression when reintervicwed after 
six years. 
USEFULNESS OF DOCTOR VS 
PATIENT SELF RATING SCALES 
The issue of relative value of using doctor 
rating scales versus patient self rating scale 
has been a subject of much controversy 
(Dcrogatis ct al., 1970; Park et al., 1965; 
Prusoff et al., 1972 and Keller et al. 1977). 
Jacobson et al. (1977) carried out a multi-
centred study at three centres at Florida, 
Massacheusets and Pennsylvania. The three 
populations did not differ in terms of socio 
demographic variables. The relative severity 
of psychopathology for the three popula-
tions was examined separately for both 18  GURMEET SINGH 
physician ratings and patient self ratings. 
The baseline symptom profiles as determined 
by the H.A.S. and H.D.S. indicated marked 
difference between the three populations. 
These differences were statistically significant 
at 0.05 level for six items between Floridra 
and Pennsylvania groups and on 10 items bet-
ween Floridra & Massacheusets group. 
In marked contrast to the physician ratings, 
the comparisons using patient self rating 
scales showed no significant difference in the 
three populations except for 1 item (Depres-
sion dejection factor). Similarly in the 56 
item S.C.L. again showed a marked similarity 
in the symptom profile between the three 
populations with no significant differences bet-
ween the three groups. On the average 74% 
of doctors ratings indicated significant differ-
ences in pathology between the populations 
as compared to only 13% for patients ratings. 
In a very large collaborative study suppor-
ted by N.I.M.H. and John Hopkins, Balti-
more and published by Covi et al., 1984; 
Downing et al., 1981; Kahn etal., 1981 and 
Lipman et al., 1981, 240 primary anxious 
and 424 primarily depressed patients were 
studied using the S. C. L. 90 which measures 
9 symptom clusters. 
Despite the statistically significant diffe-
rences in level of distress on three dimensions 
of symptomatology the overall pattern of pro-
file was very similar in the two groups. Indeed, 
were it not for the differences between the 
groups on the relative rank ordering of anxiety 
(1.5 in anxiety group versus 6 in depressive 
group) and depressive (4 in anxious group 
versus 1 in depressed group) the symptoms 
correlations in ranks would be almost identi-
cal. Clearly then there is a remarkable simi-
larity of symptom profiles among the anxious 
and depressed patients attending the out-
patient departments. 
USE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS TO DISTI-
NGUISH ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION 
In a recent study by Mountjoy and Roth 
(1982) a total of 117 patients meeting the 
inclusion criteria as suffering from anxiety 
(74) depression (43 patients) were adminis-
tered Hamilton Depressive Rating Scale, 
Gelder and Marks scale for agroraphobia and 
social phobia and the self rating scale for 
anxiety (Lipsedge, 1971) and modified Zung 
self rating scale for depression and the New 
castle Anxiety—Depressin Scale (Burney, 
1972). 
A principal component analysis of the total 
initial scores of all the rating scales yielded 
two factors. Factor I was a general factor of 
severity as the loadings of all the scales on this 
were positive and it accounted for 43% of the 
variance. There were no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the two diagnostic 
groups in their mean scores on this component. 
The second component was a bipolar factor 
which accounted for 21.3% of the variance. 
Plots of patients scores showed more anxious 
patients at one end, more depressives at the 
other with some overlap in between. Depen-
ding on the cut off point the misclassification 
rate in relation to clinical diagnoses was arou-
nd 33%. The most powerful discriminators 
were the Hamilton Depression and Hamilton 
Anxiety Scales in one direction and the anxiety 
phobic scales on the other, while both the 
anxiety and depression self rating scales were 
totally nondiscriminating. 
Similarly Zubin and Fliess (1970) carried 
out a review of all earlier factor analytic 
studies using self report and doctors rating 
scales and concluded that it was difficult to 
arrive at separate anxiety and depressive 
factors. 
A study carried out in our department 
(Singh and Sharma, 1988) on a group of 30 
patients each of generalized anxiety disorder, 
dysthymic disorder and mixed anxiety depres-
sion, the clinical symptoms were recorded as 
per DSM III criteria, factor analysis by 
varimax rotation was carried out and evalua-
tion was done by using doctor rating scales 
viz. HAS and HDS and two patient self rating THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SYNDROME  19 
scales viz. TMAS and ADI, yielding five fac-
tors-Factor DI, this factors had high loading 
on depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness 
and suicidal ideas (0.864) but also has fairly 
high loading on anxious mood (0.54). The 
second Factor (P Factor) was constituted by 
generalized fatigue, aches and pains, palpitat-
ion, breathlessness etc. This was called the 
physiological arousal factor and interestingly 
was corelated with high scores on HAS (0.641) 
and TMAS (0. 51)- suggesting that this acc-
ounts in large measure for syndrome of anxi-
ety as measured by these tests. This along 
with the psychic anxiety factor (Factor-Ill) 
and somatic anxiety (Factor-I V) correlate well 
with HAS-Factor-III represents psychic anxiety 
(HAS 0.417) and factor IV somatic anxiety HAS 
(0.448). 
Although Factor I Depressive Factor covers 
most of the symptoms of depression but also 
includes Anxiety-the main symptom of anxi-
ous mood is part of the Depression factor DI 
while Psychic anxiety and somatic anxiety are 
separate factors which correlate strongly with 
these symptoms on HDS but not with HAS. 
Thus it is clear that all these standardized 
rating scales which were ostensibly developed 
for the purpose of detecting and grading either 
anxiety and/or despression, have in each 
instance, items descriptive of the other type of 
emotional change and are therefore heteroge-
nous rather than unidimensional in content. 
Scales such as the Hamilton depression and 
anxiety scale which have proved clinically to 
be the best discriminators also contain the 
widest span of items relating to a general emo-
tional disorder, both the psychic anxiety and 
somatic anxiety components of the HDS have 
a very strong correlation with the anxiety 
syndrome. 
What stands out from this is that the self 
rating scales which are the least likely to be 
contaminated by the observers preconcep-
tions prove unable to differentiate between 
anxiety and depression which the observer 
rating scales do quite well-suggesting that the 
observers preconceived notions are highly 
responsible for this difference. However a 
counter argument often raised is that the diffe-
rentiation between the emotional states of 
anxiety and depression require a certain degree 
of introspection and linguistic sophistication 
which the patient may be unable to clearly 
formulate. To my mind this objection is not 
very convicing since it is possible that he is not 
suffering either from anxiety or depression 
which are clinical entities created by psychia-
trists but is basically describing a state of dysp-
horia with varying levels of anxiety and depres-
sion. 
EFFECT OF DRUGS IN TREATMENT 
OF ANXIEYY AND DEPRESSION 
(Is the drug effect anti anxiety or antidep-
resant) 
The question whether drugs used to treat 
patients with mixed anxiety and depression 
really effect the anxiety or depression or both 
is a very relevant question. It is commonly 
observed that symptoms of both anxiety and 
depression improve simultaneously, but many 
authors feel that the main effect is on depre-
ssion and the relief of anxiety is secondary 
to this antidepressant effect. Another possi-
bility is that both anxiety and depression are 
symptoms of a unitary underlying disorder 
and the drugs act on this basic disturbance 
resulting in improvement of both. 
Overall (1977) using data from four dou-
ble blind studies of low dose phenothiazines 
Treatment Group Measured 
Phcnothiazine Placebo 
Change score on anxiety 
factor 4.15 2.97 
Change scores on depression 
factor 4.15 2.23 
Anxiety change score adjus-
ted for depression change 1.94 1.78 
Depression change score ad-
justed for anxiety change 0.34 0.98 20  GURMEET SINGH 
versus placebo in the treatment of anxious-
depressed patients-factor analysed the data. 
The results show a highly significant diffe-
rence between drug and placebo in producing 
improvement in both anxiety and depression. 
Analysis of co-variance was then applied to 
see whether change in one was effected by im-
provement in the other. 
The analysis of change in anxiety with 
change in depression and vice versa revealed 
no significant difference between drug and 
placebo. It is thus clear that in anxious and 
depressed patients, phenothiazines have no 
effect on anxiety that is separate from that on 
depression and vice versa and therefore proba-
bly it acts on a common underlying psycho-
pathology. 
In a study carried out in our department 
(Sharma and Singh, 1984), the effects of imi-
pramine and diazepam was studied on 30 
patients each of generalized anxiety disorder, 
dysthmic disorder (as per DSM III criteria) 
and 30 patients of mixed anxiety depression-
Evaluation was done using two doctor rating 
scales viz. HAS., and H. D.S. and two patient 
self rating scales viz. Taylor Mainfest Anxiety 
Scale and Amritsar Depressive Inventory. 
Both drugs were found to be equally effec-
tive in reducing anxiety in all groups (62.8% 
and 62.2% by imipraminc and diazepam res-
pectively). Imipramine was significantly 
better in reducing the symptom of depression 
while diazepam was significantly better in 
reducing fear. None of the other symptoms 
was discriminatory. Our findings thus sup-
port the suggestion of Akiskal (1984) that 
mixed anxiety-depression is the most common 
dysphoric mood state and responds equally 
well to antidepressants as antianxiety 
agents. 
The patterns of antidepressant drug effects 
are of considerable interest. Apart from 
their established role in treatment of severe 
depressions, they have been reported to be 
effective for treatment of phobic and obsessive 
compulsive phenomenon (Ananth, 1980; 
Insell, 1982; Marks, 1980; Sheehan et al., 
1980). It is relevant here, that in anxiety disor-
ders, too, imipramine was more effective than 
chlordiazepoxide or placebo in reducing 
anxiety as well as depression (Kahn et al., 
1981; Singh et al., 1986). In patients of mixed 
anxiety-depression and related syndromes the 
few studies that report measures across a broad 
spectrum of different symptoms, antidepres-
sant drugs seem to improve both in a pattern 
of a general patholytic effect e.g. Shehan et al. 
(1980) found that imipramine and phenelzine 
patients improved significantly on every 
measure, regardless of whether it concerned 
phobia, anxiety, depression, hostility, inter-
personal sensitivity, somatic and obsessive-
compulsive symptoms. Marks et al. (1980) 
reported similar findings of a general path-
olysis for rituals, depression, anxiety and 
social adjustment. 
Given the general patholytic effect of 
antidepressant drugs it may be misleading to 
concentrate on one or two aspects eg. panic 
anxiety attack or depressive features as their 
central focus of action because these drugs 
also block a number of other symptoms which 
all intercorrelate highly to the order of 0.6 
or more, it is illogical to accept any one of 
these features as primary unless and until 
detailed analysis has shown that change in 
that feature precedes change in the other 
features. This has not been done, one predic-
tor of drug effect seems to be the starting level 
of dysphoria-dmg effects being best when this 
level is high and being absent when it is low. 
This is shown clearly in a comparison of some 
studies reported in the literature (See Table 
II and Table III). 
It is suggested that there may be a minimal 
threshold of dysphoria below which a drug 
effect is unlikely. The potential importance 
of this point is testified by the study of Marks 
(1980) who found a strong correlation between 
initial depression and outcome in a group of 
obsessive compulsive patients when the top 
and bottom quartiles were compared, but THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SYNDROME  21 
TABLE II. General Patholytic Effect of Imipramine 
Imipraminc 
effect 
Imipramine 
X Depression 
Imipramine 
X Phobic Severity 
Agoraphobia 
Phobic anxiety (SCL) 
Panic 
Tension-anxiety(POMS) 
Depression (SCH-Self) 
Depression (SCL-Dr.) 
Anger (SCL-Self) 
Anger (SCL Dr.) 
Somatic (SCL-Self) 
Global improvement 
.05 
.05 
. 1 
.05 
.05 
.001 
.05 
. 1 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.001 
.01 
.05 
.05, .01, etc.—Significant on ANCOVA  — Not Significant 
TABLE III. Outcome Verms Initial Depression Score 
Drug Effect Moderate 
Initial Mean Depression Score 
Moderate-Mild 
Mild Absent 
Present 
Absent 
Shcehanet al. (1980) 
Mc Nair & Khan (1984) 
Pecknold et al. (1980) 
Ananth et al. (1980) 
Marks etal. (1980) 
Thoren et al. (1980) 
Tyrcretal. (1973) 
Zitrin et al. (1984) 
Mavissakalian & 
Michelson (1982) 
Gittelman-Klein & 
Klein (1971) 
Insel et al. (1982) 
Zitrin et al. (1980) 
Marks etal. (1982) 
Solyom et al. (1981) 
Marks et al. (1980) 
Thoren et al. (1980) 
this effect disappeared when it was analysed 
for the entire sample. 
Johnstone et al. (1980) were not only 
unable to find any difference in response to 
amitryptiline with or without benzodiaze-
pines, between anxiety states and depressive 
disorders, but found it impossible to differen-
tiate clinically between these two syndromes 
by any definable criteria. 
From the above review it is clearly evident 
that anxiety and depression are neither clearly 
defined nor distinct entities either in terms of 
their clinical phenomenology, in their course, 
outcome or response to treatment. Further, 
they can not be distinguished as such by 
patients when asked to rate whether they are 
suffering from anxiety or depression using 
self rating scales. Factor analytic studies 
also confirm that anxiety symptoms invari-
ably have their highest loading on the depres-
sive factor while psychic and somatic anxiety 
constitute separate factors. The same is 22  GURMEET SINGH 
true when we look at the numerous control-
led studies of treatment of anxiety and depres-
sion with antianxiety, antidepressant or pheno-
thiazine drugs. In all cases there is no signi-
ficant difference in overall response between 
the different diagnostic groups except that 
antidepressants are more effective in allevia-
ting the symptoms of sad mood, while and 
anxiety drugs are more effective against symp-
toms of fear. 
DISCUSSION 
What then is this entity that the psychia-
trists are easily able to identify and label as 
anxiety neurosis but which the patient himself 
is unable to pinpoint. To my mind this is a 
historical artifact like Kraepelin's dichotomy 
of schizophrenia and MDP. What we are 
seeing is in fact a condition of 'dysphoria'— 
something similar to what Lopez-lbor refers 
to as anxious thymopathy, but which I would 
prefer to term as the Emotional Distress Syn-
drome. 
This E.D.S. which could result from 
various causes should be seen as a non specific 
reaction of the individual to emotional conflict 
or trauma at the conscious/psychic level, 
just as inflammation of the body occurs as a 
response to any noxious agent or injury at the 
physical base. This can then be said to be 
the menial equivalent of the General Adapta-
tion Syndrome as described by Selyc. If this 
is so, then it is logical to assume that this EDS 
will be equally responsive to all thymopathic/ 
or antidysphoric drugs-including antianxiety 
and antidepressant drugs which act through 
the central neural sites which are also concer-
ned in the perception and expression of emo-
tions, it is then important and possible to 
distinguish, the symptomatology and treat-
ment of nonspecific stnws resulting in the emo-
tional distress syndrome which would be 
characterised by three clusters of symptoms a) 
mood changes—anxious or depressed b) 
physical symptoms affecting any organ or 
system, c) change in behaviour. 
The Emotional Distress Syndrome would 
thus replace the nonspecific term of generalized 
anxiety and include all cases of mixed anxiety 
depression, thus doing away with the artificially 
created anxiety—-depression dichotomy within 
the broad area of emotional distress. This 
I believe would lead to more definitive research 
on the causes, clinical manifestation and 
treatment of these non-specific emotional 
disorders in terms of the specific nature of 
psychological and social stressors that produce 
these specific defense mechanisms. 
Finally I would like to suggest that all anxie-
ty is not necessarily neurotic. As I have tried 
to bring out in this presentation every human 
being as long as he is alive is suffering from 
what I have referred to as the normal existen-
tial anxiety in relation to his inner self, and 
is to be distinguished from this adaptive human 
response to environmental stress and mani-
festing as this emotional distress syndrome. 
Only when this adaptive process fails and 
the individual develops a chronic residual 
state characterised by one or more maladap-
tive patterns of behaviour should the person 
be said to have a neurotic disorder (See Table 
III). 
An understanding of the individuality of 
each person is essential if we are to under-
stand the factors that predispose one person 
and not another to some specific clinical 
disorder as well as the particular event which 
proves noxious, in that it seems to precipitate 
the disorder at this time and not some other 
time. Perhaps in the future, research will 
help to identify the persons predisposed to 
specific stress and to enable us to prevent the 
subsequent break down. 
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